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LETTER DATED 25 AUGUST 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer you to the allegations and calumnies contained in the letter dated 10 August 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations (document S/24414).

Relying on what it calls "various independent sources", the Iranian letter conveys fallacious reports and baseless allegations concerning the situation in southern Iraq, which it characterizes as a threat to regional and international peace and security.

By feigning concern for the Iraqi civilian population and linking that with the question of international peace and security, the letter in question succeeds only in revealing aspects of the Iranian role in the American, British and French scheme aimed at committing fresh aggression against Iraq and placing its security, territorial integrity and national unity in the gravest danger in violation of the principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations.

Recent events have confirmed, with material and documentary evidence, that there is Iranian involvement in the anti-Iraq scheme that is exemplified in the dispatch of infiltrators to carry out acts of sabotage in Iraqi marshland areas. This involvement and its timing cannot but raise major questions as to the relationship between the acts of interference in Iraq's internal affairs in which Iran has been engaged and the infamous policy of the United States and its allies that has the same objective and their officially declared readiness to use brute force in order to partition Iraq. The Iranian Government has failed to see that schemes for the fragmentation of Iraq on an ethnic and confessional basis also carry with them a grave threat to the independence and sovereignty of all the countries of the region, and of Iran itself in particular, and that the basic goal of such schemes is to deprive the countries of the region, and not only Iraq, of the constituents of their political and economic strength and plunge them into a bottomless pit of

ethnic and confessional conflict for the purpose of bringing them under control and reviving loathsome colonialist dispensations in new shapes and forms.

Iran would be well advised to refrain from interfering in Iraq's internal affairs and to respond to Iraq's initiative calling for the establishment of relations of good-neighbourliness, as conveyed in the letter of 14 August 1990 from the President of the Republic of Iraq addressed to the President of the Republic of Iran.

So that the international community may be informed of Iranian schemes to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs and jeopardize its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity, I set forth hereunder information on incidents involving such unlawful interference that has recently come to light and is supported by material evidence.

1. Iran has prepared a major plan of infiltration into the southern area of Iraq so as to establish there a permanent Iranian presence and to develop that presence into extensive sabotage operations by benefiting from its previous unsuccessful experience of infiltration into Iraq in March 1991. Iran has proceeded to train Iranian saboteurs proficient in Arabic to undertake this task, to recruit mercenaries and, in violation of all international covenants and conventions relating to the treatment of prisoners, to use coercion and brainwashing to change the allegiance of Iraqi prisoners it is holding and to use them to carry out its plans. The objectives of the Iranian scheme include the following:

(a) To gather political and economic information on Iraq and on the locations of Iraqi army camps, civilian industrial facilities and stores of foodstuffs;

(b) To assassinate a number of Iraqi government officials with a view to creating instability in the country;

(c) To carry out armed attacks on Iraqi military units in border areas and elsewhere;

(d) To establish and develop clandestine bases for saboteurs inside Iraq's eastern marshlands, which extend along the southern Iraq-Iran borders, from where they may infiltrate into the inner marshlands of Iraq, having been provided by Iran with forged identity cards, documents and stamps;

(e) To carry out acts of intimidation, murder, burglary and theft on the public highways and in towns and engage in armed operations against government installations and camps in order to prepare for wide-scale action resembling the extensive Iranian infiltration and sabotage that took place in March 1991 but beginning from inside Iraq and expanding at a subsequent stage by means of sweeping infiltration across the borders;

(f) To provide Iranian infiltrators with counterfeit Iraqi currency printed in Iran to be circulated inside Iraq in order to undermine confidence in the Iraqi currency and sabotage the national economy.

2. The parts of the Iranian scheme that have been implemented are as follows:

(a) Preparation and training of infiltrators in Iranian camps at Ahvaz, Mohammerah, Abadan, Bakhtaran and Sarbil Zahab, large groups of whom have been introduced from Iran into Hawr al-Hawizah and from there into the western marshlands. Iran is conducting the operation from this area because of the ease with which infiltration from it can be carried out;

(b) Establishment of 10 or more Iranian intelligence centres close to the Iraqi borders (from Shalamcheh at Basra to the area south of Khanaqin) and of four Iranian intelligence centres inside Iraq in the northern Iraqi cities of Dohuk, Shaqlawah, Diyanah and Klar, the duties of which have been to organize and supervise infiltration activities;

(c) Conveyance of weapons, military equipment, forged currency and leaflets into Iraq in the marshland area and in the northern areas of Iraq;

(d) Transmission by Iranian broadcasting directed against Iraq of instructions to saboteurs, and continued dissemination in Iranian broadcasts of hostile statements and announcements;

(e) More than 15 assassinations of Iraqi officials by Iranian saboteurs in the governorates of Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar and in areas along the marshlands, more than 30 thefts of civilian vehicles, particularly on the expressways between the centre and south of the country, and a number of incidents in which houses belonging to citizens in areas close to the marshlands have been broken into.

3. The Iraqi authorities concerned have been able to thwart some aspects of the scheme, as follows:

(a) In April 1992, an Iranian espionage network was uncovered at Basra which had been run by Iranian officers at Ahvaz.

(b) Espionage networks have been uncovered that operate under the name "Hizbullah", which is similar to the Iranian party in Lebanon. As is well known, this party operates under Iranian central control (military intelligence and the intelligence services of the Iranian Guard). Elements that belonged to these networks have acknowledged that their task was to assassinate personnel working for international agencies and organizations in order to place a strain on relations between such organizations and Iraq.

(c) At the beginning of July 1992, an espionage and sabotage network was apprehended that had been working on behalf of Iranian intelligence under the direction and supervision of the official in charge of the Iranian intelligence centre at Ahvaz, Ahmed Farzandeh. A quantity of weapons and

explosives of Iranian manufacture, forged Iraqi documents printed in Iran and quantities of counterfeit Iraqi currency in 50-dinar denominations that they had in their possession were seized. The members of the network acknowledged that Iranian intelligence had recruited many mercenaries with the intention of carrying out acts of sabotage inside Iraq and that Iranian intelligence had established a number of bases for its members and agents in remote areas inside the marshes. The task of these bases is to harass military units, attack camps, engage in highway robbery and rob citizens. The bases have been supplied with Racal radio communications equipment to transmit the information obtained by personnel from inside the marshlands to Iran (the intelligence centre at Ahvaz) by means of a Racal device in Iran linked with the aforesaid equipment in the marshes. The questioning of four of the persons from this network revealed the following:

They acknowledged that they had entered the country illegally by infiltrating from Iran, having been trained by Iranian intelligence in various types of weapons and ways of planting explosives, in order to engage in sabotage.

They confessed that they had taken part in the events of the episode of treachery and betrayal that took place in March 1991 and that they had fled to Iran after fighting with Iraqi military units in the city of Amarah.

They confessed that they had been instructed by Iran to gather information on Iraqi military units, to endeavour to recruit supporters through material inducements and to operate under the name of the so-called "Hizbullah" linked directly with the intelligence service of the Iranian Guard, one of the formations of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. Iran also assigned them the tasks of establishing sabotage bases, setting up fixed and mobile headquarters for sobotage in the marshes and instructing their personnel to prepare to engage in new acts of civil disturbance in the same manner as during the incidents of March 1991.

Iran assigned them the task of securing infiltration routes that would allow them to link up with their personnel in the marshlands and thence to return to Iran to obtain all forms of material and moral support and various types of weapons after establishing refuges for themselves inside Iraq.

They confessed that they had brought explosives and quantities of counterfeit Iraqi currency into Iraq, using forged identity papers, forms and stamps that had been arranged for them by Iranian intelligence, and that they had brought them in through Hawr al-Musharrah in the Maysan Governorate.

They further confessed that they had carried out the following acts of sabotage:

The bombing of the Banafsaj nightclub and another nightclub in the Amarah city centre on 2 January 1992 with explosive charges.

The placing of an explosive charge behind the Maysan Governorate building on 25 March 1991.

They acknowledged that the explosives they had brought into Iraq from Iran for the purpose of carrying out acts of sabotage and spreading panic and intimidation among citizens were of Iranian manufacture. Forensic examination of the charges that had exploded or were rendered harmless further demonstrated that they were of Iranian manufacture. They also confessed that Iranian intelligence had advised them to remove the paper and cardboard wrappings from weapons, explosives and other sabotage equipment, since such wrappings showed their origin as being of Iranian manufacture, so as not to leave any evidence that Iran was colluding with this sabotage function.

(d) Some 168 Iraqi prisoners registered with the International Committee of the Red Cross have been apprehended. The Iranian regime had kept them under psychologically harsh conditions and had brainwashed them in order to induce them to work against their country. Most of them gave themselves up to Iraqi forward military units on the borders between Iraq and Iran.

(e) On the night of 23/24 July 1992, a force of some 150 armed men from the Iranian side advanced and attacked Iraqi units in the Khanaqin area, 6 kilometres inside Iraqi territory. This violation of the cease-fire was reported to the team of United Nations observers.

(f) In the marshlands area and in the Khanaqin area, Iraqi units have seized Iranian-manufactured equipment, leaflets and forged identity papers that were in the possession of Iranian infiltrators. The evidence was shown to the press and to correspondents of the international news agencies in Iraq on Thursday, 6 August 1992. I am transmitting to you herewith samples of this evidence. With a subsequent letter, I shall provide you with authentic copies of the documents, identity papers and stamps that were seized along with the infiltrators, with a videotape of the confessions of certain members of sabotage networks sent by Iran and with a second videotape of an interview with some Iraqi prisoners registered with the ICRC who were forced by the Iranian regime to work against their country.

The above evidence and much else besides reveals the involvement of the Iranian Government in the anti-Iraqi scheme being promoted by the United States of America as well as the violation on its part of the principles of good-neighbourliness and its intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq. It further reveals the falsity of the allegations and calumnies contained in the said Iranian letter and a desperate and ignominious attempt to hide behind empty slogans and allegations that are refuted by the facts, documents and

material evidence by which the hostile acts of the Iranian regime against the Republic of Iraq and the Iraqi people are to be condemned.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex


بسمه تعالی

کارت ورود

واحد بسیج مستضعفین

نام

نام پدر

مرکز اسلامی
بررسیهای سیاسی


شماره پلاک

بسمه تعالی

تاریخ اعزام

کارت پلاک

نام و نام خانوادگی

نام پدر

شماره شناسنامه

تاریخ تولد

اعزامی از

نوع عضویت: رسمی ☐ افتخاری ☐ قراردادی ☐ بسیج ☐ وظیفه ☐

آدرس محل سکونت

تلفن

این کارت صرفا برای مشخص کردن هویت فرد است و هیچگونه ارزش دیگری ندارد.

کارت شناسائی
لشکر ۹ بدر
مجاهدین عراقی
نام و نام خانوادگی
نوع عضویت
شماره کارت ٤٤١٣ - ع
مدت اعتبار تا ۱۳۷۰/٦/۳۰
رئیس ستاد لشکر ۹ بدر


شماره ۲۷۵۵۹
به نمائی
تاریخ ۷۰/۸/۲
برادر
فرمانده
نوع عضویت
جهت آموزش نظامی میتواند مدت ۱۶ روز از تاریخ ۷۰/۸/۳
لغایت
از مرخصی استفاده نماید
ملاحظات:
توجه: این برگ تا ۲۴ ساعت پس از اتمام مرخصی



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



بسمه تعالی

کارت پلاک

شماره پلاک

تاریخ اعزام

نام و نام خانوادگی

نام پدر

شماره شناسنامه

تاریخ تولد

اعزامی از

نوع عضویت: رسمی ☐ اقدامی ☐ قراردادی ☐

آدرس محل سکونت

تلفن

این کارت صرفاً برای مشخص کردن هویت فرد است و هیچگونه ارزش دیگری ندارد

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

گواهینامه
لشکر ۹ بدر
مجاهدین عراقی

نام و نام خانوادگی
نوع عضویت
کد عضویت
شماره کارت
مدت اعتبار

کارت شناسائی سپاه بدر
بسیج مردمی
نام: عبد الصمد حسین کمپیر السکینی
تاریخ و محل تولد: ۱۳۴۵ بصره
شماره کارت: ۰۶۶۱
تاریخ اعتبار:

کارت شناسائی
لشکر ۹ بدر
مجاهدین عراقی

نام و نام خانوادگی عبدالنبی علی
نام پدر
نوع عضویت بسیج مردمی
کد عضویت
۰۹۵۷۱۴۴/۲
شماره کارت ۲۰۴۸
مدت اعتبار ۱۳۷۰/۶/۱
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
البطاقة الشخصية

صادرة بموجب قانون الأحوال المدنية رقم ٦٠ لسنة ١٩٦٣ المعدل

مجلس اسلامی

شماره ۱۰۷۵۲
تاریخ ۷۰/۶/۳۰
پیوست
طبقه‌بندی

(و اعدوا لهم ما استطعتم من قوه)

به آقایان‌های محترم مقیم جاده حاج عمران در خط ک ۶۴ اروسیه

از طرف ساختمانهای مقیم بهمراه شهید قرارگاه نصر رمضان

موضوع : تردد

سلام علیکم

احتراما افراد ذیل میتوانند بهمراه امکانات قید شده از

محور حاج عمران- شرچین بمقصد خاک عراق تردد نمایند/

لیست امکانات	لیست افراد
۱-	۱- نازل سالم حسین
۲-	۲- نعمی حسن محمد
۳-	۳- خالد نصار- محمد
۴-	۴-
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المركز الاسلامي
للدراسات السياسية
ايران . طهران
ص.ب: ٥٥٩٣ - ١١٣٦٥
الرقم :
التاريخ :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

مرکز اسلامی
بررسیهای سیاسی

به : نیروهای نظامی وانتظامی

از : مرکز اسلامی بررسیهای سیاسی

سلام علیکم ..

احتراما بدینوسیله اسامیهای زیر راجهت رفت وبرگشت به خاک عراق معرفی می نمائیم ضمنا برادران از مجاهدین عراقی ومورد اطمئنان این مرکز میباشند.

"ازهمکاری شما سپاسگذاریم ومنا دمالتوفیق"

اسامیها :-

١ - برادر مهند جاسم امین
٢ - برادر رزگار محمد صالح
٣ - برادر احمد محمود صالح
٤ - برادر حسن ابراهیم بصیر
٥ - برادر سعد کاظم ابراهیم

مرکز اسلامی بررسیهای سیاسی